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dan is the American self-made man, at almost his strongest and crudest. His son Bibbs, dreamy, shrewd, a semi-invalid, and a vexatious puzzle to his father, is brought home from a sanitarium to be put right into the business—to become a slave of Bigness, like his exemplary brothers. Bibbs does not like it; he questions the sanity of it all; he wants to be a writer. There is a clash of wills between Sheridan and his son, in which one's sympathy at first—until life readjusts matters—is wholly with the misunderstood boy. Next door to the Sheridan palace lives Mary Vertrees, the daughter of parents once rich, but now reduced to shabby gentility—a girl of high breeding and high soul. Mary feels it her duty to marry for money, but when it comes to the critical point she cannot. Instead she falls beautifully in love with Bibbs; but, unfortunately, this becomes apparent to others just after the death of Sheridan's eldest son, whom, as it seemed, she had been trying to ensnare. The story turns out, one feels, as it would have to in life, and, though it turns out happily, the grimest realism could hardly produce a stronger impression of inevitableness. When one has finished reading it, the conviction is borne in upon one that Mr. Tarkington is neither a realist, nor a romanticist, nor a localist, nor an impressionist, nor any special kind of literary artist, but simply a complete novelist, of that type and temperament which, on the whole, has added most to the world's sum of imaginative enjoyment and right feeling.

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THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE. By H. W. C. DAVIS, M.A. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

Treitschke was not, of course, the grand originator of that German concept of life which is now being put to so tragic a test. Like all thinkers but those of the very first rank, he was quite as much the product of his times as the molder of them. With real eloquence and insight he formulated general ideas such as would explain and justify the progress of the German Empire; and because he was singularly gifted with that more or less unequal mixture of strong feeling and abstract reason which often passes for sublimated common sense, he was able to give a certain impetus and direction to the political tendencies of which he approved. Through Treitschke's thought there runs a vein of passionate practicality, an optimism apparently based not upon ideals, but upon realities. His reasoning strips the idea of liberty of its false glamour, but preserves its substance as an attainable human good. The aristocratic principle he regards as a law of nature; it is necessary, he thinks, that millions should slave in order that a few thousands may be students or painters or poets. But this is not a thing to be deplored, because the essentials of happiness, which depend upon other faculties than the intellect, are as open to the toiling millions as to the cultured few. War, too, is not merely a necessary evil, but a thing to glory in—a position supported

by many familiar arguments. Treitschke was very human—that is, he was, as all Germans are said to be, pre-eminently a man of feeling. He therefore pictures a cosmos into which one may conceivably enter with zest, and he seems to have in mind, even in his most iconoclastic mood, the conserving of human values. In short, one feels that on his philosophic side Treitschke is no mere devil's advocate, but simply one of the long line of thinkers who have endeavored to make the world more habitable by reconciling humanity to its conditions. It is easy to understand the persuasiveness of his writings apart from their appeal to German patriotism.

Nor can he be held personally responsible for certain extreme views thought to be consequences of his teachings. To be sure, he defended the principle that treaties hold good only *rebus sic stantibus*, but he never recommended the policy of merely pretending to respect treaties until the opportune moment arrives for violating them. Nowhere do his writings reveal anything like an absolute contempt for international law; and although, as President Hadley has pointed out, it is an obviously weak point in his system that he allowed far too little weight and significance to international public opinion, Treitschke was ethical by instinct and intention.

And yet, despite his sincerity, his clear vision of facts, his occasional visions of truth, Treitschke was by no means a profound or a thoroughly trustworthy thinker. His contributions to the philosophy of history seem, in fact, no more considerable than those of Haeckel to metaphysics. Just as Haeckel, who was primarily a scientist, extended his point of view into philosophy with a degree of blindness to some fundamental distinctions, so Treitschke, reasoning from the point of view of a practical statesman, as much as from that of philosopher, expands his doctrines to almost their farthest extent without seeming to be aware of certain inconsistencies. There is in him a kind of dangerous dogmatism, an overconfidence in the universal validity of the point of view derived from his special studies. If he had not generalized, if instead of making a sort of patriotic religion of his beliefs, he had merely set himself the task of showing the advantages of the Prussian system to Germany and of criticizing the systems of other nations from a Prussian point of view, hostile critics could find little unsoundness in him.

Such, at least, is the impression made upon a fairly unbiased mind by a perusal of Mr. Davis's book, which consists chiefly of extracts from Treitschke's principal works, interspersed with brief explanatory comments and criticisms. Treitschke's views, the author notes, were developed through years of controversy—a fact which in part explains their rather obvious lack of unity and moderation. There is, indeed, a vast difference between the liberalism expressed by the historian in his early work, *Die Freiheit*, and the sterner doctrines formulated in the more mature and comprehensive treatise *Die Politik*. Into the latter, Mr. Davis tells us, Treitschke

"wove the best of the political ideas which he had elaborated in his essays from *Die Freiheit* onward. These ideas did not always benefit by transplantation from their original context into an academic oration. Half-truths, which are salutary correctives to the equally one-sided views of an opponent, may become monstrous paradoxes when the original debate is forgotten." One cannot but admit the truth of this; yet if one finds a certain aberration in Treitschke's thought, one is inclined to look deeper for the cause. And this cause ultimately seems to be that, no matter of what the historian is professedly writing, he is really thinking of Germany, of the benefits of Prussian hegemony, of the effects of the wars of 1860 and 1870.

In August, 1870, he published an essay discussing the terms of peace which he thought Germany entitled to demand, and incidentally defining his views of the right of a State to annex territory. The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, he argued, was both legitimate and necessary, and in the main he put his case upon more or less defensible grounds; but in a part of his reasoning one cannot resist the belief that the thought of Germany's destiny and that alone determined his doctrine. "We Germans," he wrote, "who know both Germany and France, know better what is for the good of the Alsatians than do these unhappy people themselves, who, in the perverse conditions of a French life, have been denied any true knowledge of modern Germany. We desire, even against their will, to restore them to themselves. . . . The spirit of a nation embraces successive as well as contemporary generations. Against the misguided wills of those who are living now we invoke the wills of those who lived before them. We call to witness all those strong German men who once impressed the stamp of our spirit on the speech, the customs, the art, and the social life of the Upper Rhine."

Indeed, the reader of Mr. Davis's extracts from *Die Politik* may not unreasonably feel that the whole is primarily an exposition of German methods and aspirations rather than a complete political philosophy. It even seems that Treitschke sometimes fails to distinguish adequately between the two. Yet he does show a desire to give his doctrines general validity and to make them acceptable to the mind and conscience of the world. In his reasoning one sees at work a process of adjustment between traditional ethical beliefs and the newer gospel of force—a process that results in compromise and sometimes in a lack of consistency.

Thus, while Treitschke adopts the Aristotelian conception of the State as a being infinitely superior to the individual, he makes the important reservation that the individual's conscience is to remain free; yet he holds that in all matters with which Church and State have an equal concern the latter should be supreme, and that the State has a right to enforce a certain measure of religious uniformity. In effect, then, as Mr. Davis points out, Treitschke reduces the State's obligation of non-interference to "a bare duty not to inquire about

the faith of an individual so long as he refrains from expressing his faith in action." Again in maintaining the thesis that there is no such thing as a universal moral law applicable to States, Treitschke fell foul of the objection that without some kind of moral standard no progress is conceivable. This difficulty he felt to be real, but he disposed of it in the most summary way. "Here," he declared, "conscience has the last word. The craving of the individual conscience for individual perfection leads to the conviction that humanity as a whole experiences the same craving for perfection. And this proof arrived at by practical reasoning is the only one of any importance." Insisting strenuously that the ideal of a world State embracing all humanity is unnatural and repulsive, he gave his argument, as it were, a theological turn that seems to do away with moral objections to State egoism. "It would be impossible to realize all that is meant by civilization in any single State. . . . The rays of divine light reveal themselves in broken form in different peoples, each of whom manifests a new shape and a new conception of Godhead." The State may become a *Culturstaat*, but, primarily, *der Staat ist Macht*; it may be more than this, but this at least it must be. The State must indeed respect public opinion, the moral sense of the world; yet self-preservation is not only its chief, but also its highest duty. Finally Treitschke's discussion of the right of a subject to resist commits him to the position that the majority, or at any rate the stronger party, may do what it would be wrong for the individual to attempt.

Doubtless Treitschke wrote with a sincere zeal for truth, strong in the thought that it is the highest morality to discard false moral concepts for truth's sake, and by no means desirous, like Nietzsche, of turning the morals of the world upside down. Nevertheless, as a political philosopher he is far from completely convincing, and it is not easy to believe that his views would have obtained wide acceptance but for the fact that they embodied German aspirations and expanded with them. As a critic he is often penetrating, and his analyses of the ideas of liberty, of party government, of nationalism, are instructive. The extracts which Mr. Davis has made from Treitschke's *Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert* consist of pungent criticisms of English institutions, policies, and men, showing how similar in letter and spirit were the German beliefs about England in 1879 and in 1914, and emphasizing in a striking manner the conviction that since 1832 England has been a decadent nation.

Mr. Davis's comments are pointed, but moderate in tone; they are made in the unimpassioned spirit of pure scholarship.

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THE CONGO AND OTHER POEMS. By VACHEL LINDSAY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914.

The title-poem of Mr. Lindsay's new book of verse belongs to a group of singular metrical compositions which are intended, the